Corruption, droits de propriété et croissance économique en Afrique subsaharienne
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.18559/rielf.2024.1.1634Mots-clés :
corruption, droits de propriété, croissance économique, AfriqueRésumé
L’objectif : L'objectif de cet article est d'analyser la relation entre la corruption, les droits de propriété et la croissance économique dans les pays d’Afrique subsaharienne.
Conception/méthodologie/approche: Le modèle utilisé dans ce travail est inspiré par Aziz et Asadullah (2016) et Walid et Kais (2019), dont la base théorique est la fonction de production Cobb-Douglas, qui comprend deux composantes majeures, à savoir le travail et le capital et d'autres facteurs institutionnels. Ainsi, l'analyse de l'interaction entre les droits de propriété, la corruption et la croissance économique est effectuée à l'aide d'un modèle VAR en panel.
Résultats: Les résultats montrent que la corruption a un effet positif sur la croissance économique alors que la croissance économique n'a aucun effet sur la corruption. Les droits de propriété favorisent la croissance économique tandis que la croissance économique ne contribue pas à protéger les droits de propriété. La corruption a un effet négatif sur les droits de propriété tandis que les droits de propriété n'ont pas d'effet sur la corruption.
Originalité/valeur : L’originalité réside dans l’analyse du rôle ambigu de la corruption en lien avec les droits de la propriété, et la croissance économique à l’échelle de nombreux pays africains.
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(c) Copyright Dramane Abdoulaye 2024
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