Application of the Game Theory in Modelling Greek Negotiation with Creditors in 2015

Authors

  • Lidia Mesjasz Cracow University of Economics
  • Czesław Mesjasz Cracow University of Economics

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18559/SOEP.2017.8.2

Keywords:

Financial crisis, Negotiations, Game theory, Economic crisis, Economic negotiations, International negotiations, Indebtedness, Foreign debt, Debt, External debt

Abstract

The concepts borrowed from the game theory are applied for the construction of the mathematical models of processes of negotiations and as a basis for creating analogies and metaphors, which, in turn, are applied for description, causal analysis and prediction. The aim of the paper is to use the concepts drawn from the game theory to model negotiations between Greece and its creditors in the year 2015, which was of crucial importance for averting the danger of a serious crisis in the European Union, and even on a global scale. In addition, the last round of negotiations of Greece with its creditors reflects the complexity of the country's debt problem and includes both the possibility of a solution for the crisis and as a sign of further tensions. As a basis for the discussion the concepts of "brinkmanship", "prisoner's dilemma" and "chicken" was adopted. 

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

Ardagna, S., Caselli, F., 2014, The Political Economy of the Greek Debt Crisis: A Tale of Two Bailouts, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 6, no. 4.
View in Google Scholar

Das, U.S., Papaioannou, M.G., Trebesch, Ch. 2012, Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010. Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts, IMF Working Paper, no. 203.
View in Google Scholar

Cohan, W.D., 2015, Plenty Deserve Blame for Greece's Woes, but Maybe Not Goldman Sachs, New York Times, July 13, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/14/business/de-albook/plenty-deserve-blame-for-greeces-woes-but-maybe-not-goldman-sachs. html?_r=0 [dostęp: 18.09.2015].
View in Google Scholar

Hargreaves-Heap, S.P., Varoufakis, Y., 2004, Game Theory: A Critical Introduction, Routledge, London and New York.
View in Google Scholar

Independent, 2015, Greece Debt Crisis: Economist Paul Krugman Admits He "Overestimated the Competence of the Greek Government", 20 July.
View in Google Scholar

Kalka, P., 2012, Unia Europejska wobec kryzysu finansów publicznych w strefie euro, Przegląd Zachodni, nr 2.
View in Google Scholar

Martin, F.M., Waller, C.J., 2012, Sovereign Debt: A Modern Greek Tragedy, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Review, vol. 94, no. 5, https://research.stlouisfed.org/ publications/review/12/09/321-340Martin.pdf [dostęp: 4.06.2015].
View in Google Scholar

Nurmi, H., 1987, W poszukiwaniu teorii rozstrzygania konfliktów, Projektowanie i Systemy, t. IX.
View in Google Scholar

Owsiak, S., 1998, Finanse publiczne. Teoria i praktyka, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa.
View in Google Scholar

Parkin, M., 1990, Economics, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., Reading, MA.
View in Google Scholar

Public sector debt statistics. Guide for Compilers and Users, 2013, IMF, Washington D.C., http://www.tffs.org/pdf/method/2013/psds2013.pdf [dostęp: 17.10.2014].
View in Google Scholar

Schelling, T., 2013, Strategia konfliktu, Oficyna, a Wolters Kluwer business, Warszawa.
View in Google Scholar

Sporek, T., 2013, Globalne konsekwencje kryzysu finansowego w Grecji, Studia Europejskie, nr 3.
View in Google Scholar

Szabó, D., 2015, Greek Dilemma, Superposition Fund, 29.05, http://www.superposi-tion.hu/en/blog/greek-dilemma [dostęp: 21.07.2015].
View in Google Scholar

Varoufakis, Y., 1991, Rational Conflict, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford.
View in Google Scholar

Varoufakis, Y., 2015, Full Transcript: Our Battle to Save Greece, New Statesman, 13.07.
View in Google Scholar

Downloads

Published

2017-08-31

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

Mesjasz, L., & Mesjasz, C. (2017). Application of the Game Theory in Modelling Greek Negotiation with Creditors in 2015. Studia Oeconomica Posnaniensia, 5(8), 18-31. https://doi.org/10.18559/SOEP.2017.8.2