Concurrence 'hybride' , innovation et régulation : un modèle de duopole

Auteurs

DOI :

https://doi.org/10.18559/rielf.2020.1.10

Mots-clés :

firme, communauté, innovation fermée, innovation ouverte, appropriation

Résumé

Cet article présente un modèle de duopole dans lequel une firme et une communauté se concurrencent en produisant des produits/services numériques tout en ayant la possibilité de partager leurs innovations pour développer leurs propres activités. Nous montrons que la firme bénéficie toujours d ' un changement de régime 'ouvert ' ou 'fermé ' d ' innovation. Notre analyse numérique souligne que, si un 'basculement fermé ' est favorable au bien-être social et à l ' innovation agrégée, celui-ci n ' est pas systématiquement profitable à la firme. Ces observations exposent clairement une défaillance de marché potentielle, tout en nuançant les vertus du paradigme d ' innovation ouverte en matière de maximisation des profits.

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Publiée

2020-06-30

Numéro

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Article scientifique

Comment citer

Le Texier, T., & Ragni, L. (2020). Concurrence ’hybride’ , innovation et régulation : un modèle de duopole. La Revue Internationale Des Économistes De Langue Française, 5(1), 222-241. https://doi.org/10.18559/rielf.2020.1.10

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