Rational partisan political cycles and unemployment : An empirical evaluation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18559/rielf.2018.1.18Keywords:
rational partisan political cycles, electoral surprise, electoral uncertainty, unemployment, OECD countries (8)Abstract
We consider the same sample of countries (eight OECD countries) as Berlemann and Marwardt (2007) with a close data base (1963-2005 or shorter period according to the available data for the monthly unemployment rate). If we consider the sample group made up by eight countries, the estimations show favorable results for the unemployment for the partisan rational theory by taking into account the degree of the electoral surprise. We show that if we make estimations by country the obtained results for the unemployment are very different according to countries: for example, for the United States, the results are favourable to the rational partisan theory but not for France notably. In comparison to Berlemann and Markwardt (2007), we also make estimations with various partisan variables (with and without taking into account the degree of the electoral surprise) to test the rational partisan theory for the unemployment. The model of Heckelmann (2006) does not give favourable results either for the whole sample of eight countries or for every country.
Downloads
References
Abraham-Frois, G. (1993). Keynes et la macroéconomie contemporaine. 4ème édition, Economica.
View in Google Scholar
Alesina, A. (1987). « Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game », Quaterly Journal of Economics, 102, 651-678.
View in Google Scholar
Alesina, A., Cohen, G. & Roubini, N. (1992). « Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Economies », Economics and Politics, 4, 1-30.
View in Google Scholar
Alesina, A., Cohen, G. & Roubini, N. (1993). « Electoral Business Cycle in Industrial Democracies », European Journal of Political Economy, 23, 1-23.
View in Google Scholar
Alesina, A., & Roubini, N. (1992). « Political Cycles in OECD Economies », Review of Economic Studies, 59, 663-688.
View in Google Scholar
Alesina, A., Roubini, N. & Cohen, G. (1997). Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy. MIT Press.
View in Google Scholar
Alesina, A., & Sachs, J. (1988). « Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States 1948-1984 ». Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 20, 63-81.
View in Google Scholar
Auberger, A., (2001). Popularité, cycles et politique économique. thèse pour l’obtention du doctorat en sciences économiques, Université Paris 2.
View in Google Scholar
Berlemann, M., & Markwardt, G. (2007). « Unemployment and Inflation Consequences of Unexpected Election Results », Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 39, 1919-1945.
View in Google Scholar
Carlsen, F. (1997). « Opinion Polls and Political Business Cycles : Theory and Evidence for the United States », Public Choice, 92, 387-406.
View in Google Scholar
Carlsen, F. (1998). « Rational Partisan Theory: Empirical Evidence for the United States », Southern Economic Journal, 65, 64-82.
View in Google Scholar
Carlsen, F., & Pedersen, E.F. (1999). « Rational Partisan Theory: Evidence for seven OECD Economies », Economics and Politics, 11, 13-32.
View in Google Scholar
Chappell, H. W. Jr, & Keech, W.R. (1988). « The Unemployment Rate Consequences of Partisan Monetary Policies », Southern Economic Journal, 55, 107-122.
View in Google Scholar
Cohen, G. (1993). Pre- and Post-Electoral Macroeconomic Fluctuations, Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Economics, Harvard University.
View in Google Scholar
Ferré, M., & Manzano, C. (2014). « Rational Partisan Theory with fiscal policy and an independent central bank », Journal of Macroeconomics, 42, 27–37.
View in Google Scholar
Fischer, S. (1977). « Long-term contracts, rational expectations and the optimal money supply rule », Journal of Political Economy, 85, 191-205.
View in Google Scholar
Gäertner, M. (1994). « The Quest for Political Cycles in OECD Economies », European Journal of Political Economy, 10, 427-440.
View in Google Scholar
Heckelman, J.C. (2002). « Electoral uncertainty and the Macroeconomy: the Evidence from Canada », Public Choice, 113, 179-189.
View in Google Scholar
Heckelman, J.C. (2006). « Another look at the evidence for rational partisan cycles », Public Choice, 126, 257-274.
View in Google Scholar
Hibbs, D. (1977). « Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policies and Outcomes in the United States », American Political Science Review, 71, 1467-1487.
View in Google Scholar
Maloney, J., Pickering, A. & Hadri, K. (2003). « Political Business Cycles and Central Bank Independence », Economic Journal, 113, 167-181.
View in Google Scholar
Rogoff, K., & Sibert, A. (1988). «Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles», Review of Economic Studies, 55, 1-16.
View in Google Scholar
Sheffrin, S. (1991). « Evaluating Rational Partisan Business Cycle Theory », Economics and Politics, 1, 239-259.
View in Google Scholar
Taylor, J. (1979). « Aggregate dynamics and staggered contracts », American Economic Review, 69, 108-113.
View in Google Scholar
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2018 Poznań University of Economics and Business
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
